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Small to Mid-Size Sporting Events: 
Are We Prepared to Recover from 
an Attack?
By Brian M.Harrell,
 Konrad Crockford,
 Pierre Boisrond,
 Sarah Tharp-Hernandez,
and Suzanne Parker
Note to the reader
This article describes a fictional deadly attack by a lone-wolf terrorist 
during a high school football event in a small town, here in the United 
States. The authors begin by describing an attack and then focus on the 
response from the medical community, city, county, state, and federal 
government officials. Next, the authors make several recommendations 
on what actions are needed to develop an effective plan to combat 
terrorist activities during a small- to mid-size sports event. Among the 
actions needed, the authors focus on the following: response planning, 
emergency action plan, incident command, policies and procedures, and 
security staff training.
Introduction
Similar to any critical infrastructure or key resource (CI/KR), American 
sports events are susceptible to various threats, including terrorism. The 
al-Qaida training manual strategically points out "blasting and destroying 
the places of amusement, immorality, and sin...and attacking vital eco-
nomic centers" as a key objective.1 Home grown terrorists have similar 
objectives while coveting media attention for their cause. Because of the 
openness and mass gathering nature of high school football stadiums, 
shopping malls, and amusement parks, they are no doubt ripe opportuni-
ties for terrorist to attack a "soft target."
The Scenario
Imagine the following scenario: it is a homecoming Friday night in Small 
Town, USA. The varsity football team takes the field to a large, boisterous 
crowd. From the corner of your eye, through the sea of letterman jackets, 
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you notice an individual retrieve an ice chest. He raises it above his head, 
mutters a prayer, and tosses it into the unsuspecting crowd below. Within 
seconds, nails, screws, and glass projectiles enter the crowd of 2000, kill-
ing 25 and injuring dozens more. Unsure if additional Improvised Explo-
sives Devices (IED) exist, the panicked crowd reacts by trampling each 
other to the exits, killing more.
The average local high school football stadium will have one ambulance 
and a small designated medical response crew on hand for possible inju-
ries incurred to players during the game. This crew, which may include a 
team physician, will become the initial Emergency Medical Service (EMS) 
providers. As such, their first act will be to call in a Mass Casualty Incident 
(MCI) to 911, or the designated local emergency response number. They 
will report the type of incident: bomb explosion with projectiles; assess 
the number of injured and type of injuries: two or more dozen with burns 
and complex major injuries, and dozens more minor injuries; and briefly 
assess the safety status at the scene for incoming responders. As a result, 
the center receiving the call will alert and dispatch all available first 
responders and notify local hospitals to prepare for an MCI event.
The Normative Response
As the on-site security team tries to stabilize the panicked crowd, EMS 
will have to begin organizing their response and initial triage while await-
ing help. All unhurt and able to walk should be asked to clear the immedi-
ate area so victims can be accessed. Those able to leave should be given a 
designated location so they can be monitored and triaged at a later point. 
Using the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) system, the only 
patient care given during initial triage should be to unblock airways and 
stop uncontrolled bleeding. Once additional crews arrive, triage can 
include moving patients for further treatment or transport based on their 
conditions, but until that point, quickly moving from victim to victim and 
providing only life-saving care will give the best outcome for the most 
patients.
In coordination with the Incident Commander (IC) and following their 
community's Incident Command System, the arriving EMS crews will cre-
ate on-site treatment areas according to injury severity and establish a 
vehicle route for efficient patient transport. Limited access to the stadium 
will create a bottleneck in the flow of response personnel and patient 
evacuation, so establishing treatment areas outside the stadium will help 
create a more efficient ongoing medical response. As medical crews per-
form initial triage, they will be marking or tagging the victims using a sys-
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tem to communicate severity and minimal patient tracking information. 
Uninjured bystanders can assist with some aspects of triage (for example, 
applying pressure to bleeding or helping move victims to another area) 
and should be utilized to free up trained personnel to reach more patients.
The most critical patients should be transported to available emergency 
trauma centers. Depending on the town, this could be 30–45 miles away. 
Stabilizing the remaining victims until transportation can be arranged 
will be the goal of the staged treatment areas. Ambulances will need to be 
used for major injuries. Subsequently, another mode of transportation 
will need to be utilized, such as team buses for the non-critically 
wounded. To keep things moving will require the senior EMS responder 
on site to continually update the status and needs of the medical response 
with the IC, who has delegating responsibilities and is able to secure addi-
tional equipment needs personnel. Careful consideration should be taken 
when considering the location of the command post, as this needs to be 
far away from the blast site yet easily accessible. The medical response 
will continue with re-triaging and treatment until all victims have left the 
scene.
Coinciding with the medical response will be the initial wave of law 
enforcement officials arriving on scene. In the event of a terrorist bomb 
detonation at a small high school football stadium, the first IC to take con-
trol of the situation is likely to be a representative of the local police 
department. Local law enforcement will have primary responsibility for 
preserving the crime scene, establishing crowd control, and serving as a 
point of contact to the media and inquiring citizens. The incident com-
mander should immediately designate a Public Information Officer (PIO) 
to supply information and coordinate with the media. It will be highly 
important to rapidly create working relationships or to call upon standing 
mutual aid agreements which are agreements between communities what 
will provide assistance to one another upon request.2 These agreements 
would be made with nearby law enforcement agencies, fire and medical 
services, hospitals, specialized task forces, local and state emergency 
management offices and also private companies involved in response and 
recovery.
This type of incident is likely to overwhelm local law enforcement, espe-
cially if they have not considered the possibility of such an event, taken 
part in bomb threat and evacuation drills, or previously established rela-
tionships with their colleagues from other local agencies. Despite the 
stress a terrorist incident will put on local law enforcement, it is inevitably 
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local law enforcement that will be first to address the situation and begin 
recovery efforts until the FBI, in coordination with other federal agencies, 
can take over.
Secondary or Follow-On Attacks
The first hurdle the IC and local law enforcement will face will be estab-
lishing crowd control to help eliminate further damage and loss of life 
while simultaneously working to preserve the crime scene and prepare for 
the possibility of a second detonation.3 A bomb squad/WMD team should 
be summoned to the scene in the event additional devices are located. In 
1989, at a semi-final football game in Sheffield, England, human stam-
peding and mass panic resulted in the deaths of 96 people. The Taylor 
Report, which inquired into the disaster, blamed failure of police control 
as the culprit. Although not the result of a terrorist event, the Sheffield 
disaster highlights the necessity for a well thought out pre-established 
operational order and contributes to the importance of establishing an IC 
under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at a stadium 
disaster.4 Public and private law enforcement officials working at small 
high school football stadiums must not be complacent in maintaining 
knowledge of NIMS, of the layout of the stadium, and of disaster response 
plans and pre-established mutual aid agreements between school district 
officials, local jurisdictional responders, and outside responders.
Terrorists may make plans to activate a second explosion aimed at harm-
ing additional victims and emergency responders. This scenario is 
unlikely in the event of a 'lone wolf' terrorist who has committed a suicide 
bombing but is still feasible if a secondary delayed device was planted. 
Local law enforcement must plan to address this potential risk and also 
preserve the crime scene for the subsequent FBI investigation. The IC will 
need to immediately designate response plans for moving people away 
from the threat, staging victims for medical care, searching the premises 
for any additional suspicious packages or persons, communicating addi-
tional response needs for activation of mutual aid, establishing measures 
for preventing media and worried citizens from approaching the stadium; 
actions should also be implemented to aid in locating evidence such as 
eyewitness statements, bomb fragments, and video surveillance if avail-
able. Most games are filmed by both teams; this will be an excellent 
resource.
Along with local law enforcement support, the fire department whose 
jurisdiction the stadium is located in will be the first on scene. Soon after 
arriving and coordinating with the IC, it will be the Fire Chief's decision 
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on what other units are required for response such as heavy equipment 
rescue, helicopter landing zone, and hazmat response, just to name a few. 
The main role of the Fire Department in this situation is to contain and 
fight any fires the explosion may have caused and begin the search and 
rescue process through the twisted wreckage of the stadium section in 
which the blast occurred. The Fire Department will be a critical asset 
when it comes to site cleanup as well.
Response Plan
Developing a response plan for a disaster emergency is a way to maximize 
resources while minimizing chaos. Another way to positively affect the 
outcome of a disaster is in prevention planning. To prevent any terrorist 
disaster, it is important to have security measures to mitigate these types 
of threats. In this post 9–11 era, organizations must implement a security 
plan to prevent disasters and threats or to effectively respond to disasters 
when they strike. The same has to be true for an organization that man-
ages stadium or arena activities. In order to mitigate threat, it is impor-
tant to focus on the following: planning process, emergency plan for the 
stadium, threat and risk assessment, command post, policies and proce-
dures, and security staff training.
The planning process is extremely important when implementing security 
measures to mitigate threats. In this process, the inputs of management, 
staff, and employees and local, county, state and federal agencies are 
needed for the development of a comprehensive security plan. For the 
process to be successful, management must fully support this initiative, 
which means there must be buy-in to the planning process. A key recom-
mendation in this process is a commitment from management to estab-
lish the leadership role of a staff security coordinator for the development 
and implementation of a safety and security plan.5 This staff security 
coordinator must have experience in law enforcement and professional 
management since she or he will be responsible for key security areas and 
be involved in all aspects of terrorist threats. It is a post with high visibil-
ity, and the coordinator must be able to build an effective planning team 
and secure the budget for the initiatives.
After developing a planning process, it is necessary to put that process 
into action and develop an emergency plan for the stadium. Having an 
emergency plan in place will definitely help reduce the chaos that is likely 
to occur in a major disaster. It is imperative that the event security offi-
cials, local, county, state and federal entities can clearly communicate 
with each other as well as with the public. This emergency plan should 
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also focus on event preparation because it will inform security officials on 
the type of event and how they should focus their efforts. Officials can 
then rule out certain threats that might be attracted to this type of event 
and be better prepared to put in place preventive measures for bomb 
threats, unauthorized entry into the stadium, isolated attacks, and vehi-
cles or packages left unattended. This emergency plan must also contain 
an evacuation plan so that the public can be informed where and how to 
evacuate during a disaster, and therefore will reduce any confusion that 
would otherwise endanger the lives of the people.
Once security is in place there needs to be a central location where all this 
data is processed and commands are issued; this area is known as the 
command post. The role of a command post is to help manage all security 
aspects associated with a sporting event.6 The command post will have a 
security director, law enforcement officials, and an incident commander 
on staff. The security coordinator and staff must determine equipment 
and staffing needs. It is extremely important to clearly state the roles and 
responsibilities of every employee in the command post, so that everyone 
knows what to do if a disaster occurs. The command post will also be 
responsible for the evacuation procedures and critical personnel staging 
areas so that entry and exit points can be monitored and controlled 
should the need for evacuation arise. If it is financially feasible a network 
of security cameras should be installed at all exit and entry points of the 
facility so that activities can be closely monitored.
It will be necessary to have a set of policies and procedures in place to dic-
tate what is or what is not suspicious behavior and what the response 
should be if these policies are broken. These policies and procedures for 
the stadium must be strictly enforced. It is impossible to eliminate all 
risks; however, one cannot allow fans to breach any security policies and 
procedures which might compromise people inside the stadium. Policies 
to control fan conduct, alcohol, access to the stadium, tailgating, parking, 
and prohibited items are some examples.
Once policies and procedures are established, it will be necessary to train 
security staff on them. Without proper training, all security planning pro-
cesses will be useless. Management must invest in the training of the 
security personnel since they need to be knowledgeable in the areas that 
apply to their roles and responsibilities. Security employees need to be 
trained in emergency response procedures, evacuation procedures, infor-
mation that constitute threats, hazardous materials, how to use emer-
gency equipment, and how to conduct a shutdown procedure, just to 
name a few.
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Conclusion
In the United States "lone-wolf terrorism" or "individual terrorism" has 
been regarded as a serious threat to public safety in recent years. The sce-
nario described above is frightening because of its impact. A disgruntled 
citizen, combined with a primitive weapon system against a soft target, 
will likely achieve success if security, preparedness, and intelligence mea-
sures are not effectively put in place. The goals of preparedness, regard-
less of event, should be: (1) know what to do in the aftermath of a disaster; 
(2) know how to do it; (3) exercise your pre-approved response plan as 
closely as possible; (4) be equipped with the right tools to do it effectively; 
and (5) compile lessons learned and areas of improvement for distribu-
tion and future use. As is true with the emergency manager and first 
responders in a community, members of the general public need informa-
tion and training if they are to know what is best to do before, during, and 
after emergencies occur.7 If the populace, first responders, and govern-
mental entities are working in unison prior to an emergency, a smoother 
response and recovery phase will likely be the result.
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